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ARTICLES
A MODEL BILL (AND COMMENTARY THEREON)
ALLOWING CHOICE OF COVERAGE UNDER
MICHIGAN'S NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE LAW
Jeffrey O'ConneU*
When no-fault insurance laws were passed in late-1960s and early-1970s,
their purpose was to ensure limited but prompt payment to accident victims by
eliminating the two variables that were most troublesome: proving fault and
collecting damages for pain and suffering. Under these new laws, motorists were
allowed to recover only for their economic losses, up to a certain amount, from
their own insurance companies without having to prove fault.' On the other
hand, if the victim's injuries were particularly severe, she/he was allowed to sue.
The results were more than satisfactory. A 1985 Department of Transportation
study indicated that almost twice as many victims were compensated and that
almost all no-fault payments were made within a year. 2
These laws, however, turned out to have one side-effect, especially severe in
states which offered substantial no-fault benefits: under the old tort system,
without no-fault benefits, traffic victims were often without funds to cover
accruing medical expenses and lost wage losses while their cases were battled
over. Thus, they often settled for relatively little rather than undergo the delay
and uncertainty of final resolution of a tort claim. But, with a tort system
buttressed by relatively generous no-fault benefits (along with growing coverage
for health care costs by private insurance, as well as Medicare and Medicaid),
traffic victims have been guaranteed resources enabling them to much more
energetically pursue tort claims, while also hiring a lawyer at a contingent fee
and therefore no initial cost.3 The result is that, in addition to the high cost of
high levels of no-fault insurance, the cost of already expensive liability insurance
became even higher, and thus auto insurance became unaffordable to many
* Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A. Dartmouth College,
1951, J.D. Harvard University, 1954.
1. See generally, Jeffrey O'Connell, A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto Insurance
Payable With and Without Regard to Fault, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 948 (1990) (the advantages of allowing
the insureds to chose between the two types of insurance); Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Auto
Insurance: Back By Popular (Market) Demand?, 26 SAN DtEoo L. Rav. 993 (1989), (arguing for
offering consumers a choice between insurance payable with and without regard to fault).
2. U.S. DP'T oF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATINO AUTO ACCIDENT VicTms: A FoLLOW-Up
REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES, 3, 4, 6 ( 1985).
3. This phenomenon is analogous to the way workers' compensation benefits subsidize a victim
of an industrial accident who is permitted to bring a product liability claim against a third party (i
e., other than his employer). But the subsidy is even stronger under no-fault auto insurance laws
since the accident victim isn't dependent on fimding a possible third party outside the system.
O'Connell & Joost, supra note 5 at 71-72; O'Connell Must Health and Disability Insurance Subsidize
Wasteful Injury Suits? 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1055, 1061 (1989).
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motorists. What actually happened, and is still going on, is best illustrated by
Michigan's no-fault auto insurance law, the one which has long been reputed
(with justification) to be the best in the country. 4 Michigan's no-fault law provides
as minimum coverages: (1) unlimited medical benefits and very high wage loss
protection (a maximum of $32,000 per year for three years), far and away the
highest no-fault benefit package in the country;' and (2) mandatory tort liability
coverage above a high (but deteriorating) threshold. Thus, in effect, Michigan
requires all motorists in Michigan to buy a "Cadillac" of auto insurance even if
they can only afford a "Chevrolet." The result? Many motorists - especially in
inner cities6 - cannot afford to buy any auto insurance, and many others face
very burdensome premiums (albeit at still relatively low cost compared to other
states).
7
On the subject of high no-fault benefits, the increase in cost is best illustrated
by what has happened to the costs of the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Asso-
ciation. According to a Michigan State Senate Report:
The increase in health-care costs has been particularly dramatic for catastrophic
claims. As more and more individuals survive severe ... head injuries and make
demands on an ever-more-expensive health-care system, the burden on the Mi-
chigan Catastrophic Claims Association (MCCA) has become extraordinary. The
MCCA was established by the Michigan Legislature in 1978 to act as a reinsurer
for all personal injury protection [i.e., no-fault] claims exceeding $250,000. The
annual assessment per insured vehicle has increased from a mere $12 in 1985 to
$22 in 1987, $32 in 1988, nearly $44 in 1989, and $66.64 in 1990.' Total annual
assessments have grown from $57.5 million in 1985 to $200 million in 1988. Even
with high assessments, the deficit of the MCCA has been estimated at $300-$500
million as of the end of 1988. 9
On the subject of the high cost of tort liability insurance above Michigan's
threshold, once again the words of the Michigan State Senate Report are instruc-
tive:
[S]trict limitation of tort remedies was a major purpose in the adoption of a no-
fault system in Michigan. As the name "no-fault" implies, the purpose of the
law was to shift the auto insurance system away from the uncertainty of the
courtroom to a system of swift and complete compensation for injuries and
losses. A careful balance was struck, exchanging the potentially enormous but
uncertain rewards of tort for the assured payment of economic losses under no-
fault. The loophole for continued tort litigation was intended to be small
permitting recovery for noneconomic loss only if an automobile accident victim
suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious
disfigurement.
When the Michigan Supreme Court finally [interpreted] ... the "verbal
4. Report on No-Fault Auto Insurance Reform in Michigan, [Michigan State] Senate Commerce
& Technology Committee, 5 (April 1990) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
5. U. S. Dep't of Transp., Compensating Auto Accident Victims 25-49 (1985); O'Connell &
Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 Va. L. Rev. 64 n. 9
(1986).
6. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 27-29.
7. Id. at 5-6.
8. The figure rose to $101 in 1991.
9. Id. at 19.
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threshold" for recovery under ...tort litigation ... in Cassidy v. McGovern,
416 Mich 104 (1982), it made the important determination that whether a serious
impairment of body function had occurred was a question of statutory construc-
tion for the judge, as long as there was no material, factual dispute about the
extent of injury. The Court also held that an injury must be "objectively
manifested" and "subject to medical measurement" and must interfere with a
person's "general ability to lead a normal life." The establishment of this "verbal
threshold" for bringing a successful lawsuit had the effect of stabilizing tort
litigation under no-fault.
However, after a change in membership, the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed itself with a decision in DiFranco v. Pickard, 427 Mich 32 (1986). In
DiFranco, the Court held that the question of whether an injury constituted a
serious impairment of body function was a question for the jury, entitling every
claim to a full trial. The Court rejected the "objectively manifest" and "general
ability to lead a normal life" criteria, opening the question of impairment to all
relevant factors. As a result of this dramatic reversal, tort litigation has been
opened up under Michigan's no-fault law.
Every claim of serious impairment of body function is now guaranteed a
full jury trial, threatening insurers with tens of thousands of dollars in attorney
fees in every case. No matter how weak the claim, the insurer must be prepared
to endure a full trial in order to eliminate the claim. As a result, settlement
values for auto accident cases have increased very dramatically.
The consequences of the DiFranco decision have already manifested them-
selves in higher insurance costs. Joseph Olson of the Michigan Insurance Fed-
eration testified that prior to DiFranco, Michigan body injury [claim] frequencies
and the average paid body injury loss per insured vehicle was in decline, while
the nation as a whole experienced increases. However, after DiFranco, Michigan
body injury frequencies and average per-vehicle losses increased, at a rate even
faster than the rest of the nation. While the per-car loss on body injury liability
went up 26.8% nationwide between 1986-1988, the loss in Michigan increased a
dramatic 30.2 percent. 0
But even without the DiFranco decision - and regardless of its effects -
data demonstrate that trying to provide very substantial no-fault benefits even
with a rigidly enforced high tort threshold can be very expensive. In New York
in 1987, for example, with a threshold similar to Michigan's and with $50,000
in no-fault benefits, the costs of tort claims above the threshold contributed 64.7
percent to the total personal injury pure premium," with the relatively high level
of no-fault benefits contributing only 36 percent.'2 For comparable figures for
Michigan, prior to DiFranco Michigan's even much higher no-fault benefits level
contributed only 64.43 percent to the pure premium, with tort claims amounting
to 35.7 percent. 3 What arguably happens in such states with substantial no-fault
10. Id. at 12-13. For more on the need for "balanced" no-fault laws, see O'Connell & Joost,
72 Va. L. Rev. 61, 63-78, supra note 5.
11. Pure premium is that portion of premium used to pay losses, thereby excluding an insurer's
expenses in marketing and administration costs as well as legal defense costs.
12. O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance: Back by Popular (Market) Demand?, 26 San. Diego L. Rev.
993, 997-999 (1989). The pure premium for bodily injury, uninsured motorist and no-fault combined
was $138.12 for no-fault alone it was $49.78.




benefits and even a high threshold is the subsidy effect mentioned above.
These problems of high no-fault benefits, coupled with a high rate of
expensive, large tort suits, prompt the following proposal for Michigan: Allow
(but do not compel) motorists to opt for a limit on their no-fault benefits in
amounts of either $250,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, or $2,000,000,' while also
allowing (but not compelling) them to opt out from tort suits for pain and
suffering even above Michigan's threshold. 5 By such reforms, auto insurance
can be made much more affordable for many more motorists, while leaving the
present system in effect for those who want - and can afford - current
coverages. 6 Even those electing limits on no-fault benefits will still have coverage
far more generous than that provided than under other states' no-fault laws.
How will the law work?
It will provide three options for motorists:
1. The present system.
2. The present level of no-fault benefits but elimination of rights to claim,
and be claimed against for, tort damages payable for pain and suffering even if
the severity of injury exceeds Michigan's tort threshold. This option is called
"optional personal protection insurance" (OPIP).'7
3. A limit on no-fault benefits of $250,000, $500,000, $1,000,000 or
$2,000,000, at the option of the insured, with, as under option two, elimination
of rights to claim, and be claimed against, for tort damages for pain and suffering
even if the severity of injury exceeds Michigan's tort threshold. This option is
called "limited optional personal protection insurance" (LOPIP).18
When two motorists who have retained the present system collide, present
law will apply with payment of no-fault benefits at current levels and preservation
of the right to claim in tort for pain and suffering above the threshold.
When two motorists collide who have elected either OPIP or LOPIP, they
will receive no-fault benefits (up to the level selected in the case of a LOPIP
insured), but will neither claim, nor be claimed against for, pain and suffering
no matter how severe the injury. But the OPIP and LOPIP insured will have
the right to claim against the other driver for pain and suffering in the event the
latter intentionally caused harm or, in any event, for economic losses in excess
of no-fault benefits as under present law.' 9
What happens in a collision between a motorist who elects the present system
and one electing either OPIP or LOPIP? The OPIP and LOPIP insureds cannot
claim against the motorist electing present coverage, nor can the latter claim
against the former, for damages for pain and suffering. Rather the motorist
14. Note 26 infra and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. For more on allowing motorists to choose between fault and no-fault insurance, see O'Connell
& Joost, supra note 5, 72 Va. L. Rev., and O'Connell supra note 1, 26 San Diego L. Rev. See also
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 29-31. For other draft bills applicable to other than Michigan, see
O'Connell, A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto Insurance Payable With and Without Regard
to Fault, 51 Oh. St. L. J. 947 (1990); A Draft Bill to Allow Choice Between Fault and Fault-Based
Auto Insurance, 27 Harv. J. on Legislation 143 (1990).
. 17. Note 25 infra and accompanying text. Note the term used in Michigan for "personal
protection (i.e., no-fault) insurance is "PIP," inverting the second "p" and the "i."
18. Note 26 infra and accompanying text.
19. Note 28 infra and accompanying text.
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electing present coverage would be allowed to claim against his or her own
company under what is called "inverse liability coverage" for pain and suffering
as if his or her company covered the driver insured under OPIP or LOPIP.
20
Such a regime mirrors "uninsured motorist coverage" existant today, which
allows injured motorists to claim damages against their own companies if the
motorist with whom they collide is uninsured. Note that under this new proposal
the costs of "uninsured motorist coverage" (now including inverse liability) will
increase, but that increase will be neatly offset by lower liability insurance costs
in that there will be fewer claims against the motorist electing today's coverage
because all those insured under OPIP or LOPIP will be precluded from asserting
such liability claims.
2'
There follow the terms of a draft bill (with commentary) effectuating these
changes.
Section 1. Section 3104 is amended and Section 3180 is added as follows:
Section 31042
(1) An unincorporated, nonprofit association to be known as the catastrophic
claims association, hereinafter referred to as the association, is created. Each
insurer engaged in writing insurance coverages which provide the security
required by THIS CHAPTER within this state, as a condition of its authority
to transact insurance in this state, shall be a member of the association and
shall be bound by the plan of operation of the association. Each insurer
engaged in writing insurance coverages which provide the security required
by section 3103(1) within this state, as a condition of its authority to transact
insurance in this state, shall be considered a member of the association, but
only for purposes of assessments under subsection (7)(d). Except as expressly
provided in this section, the association shall not be subject to any laws of
this state with respect to insurers, but in all other respects the association
shall be subject to the laws of this state to the extent that the association
would be were it an insurer organized and subsisting under chapter 50.
(2) The association shall provide and each member shall accept indemnification
for 100% of the amount of ultimate loss sustained under personal protection
insurance coverages, INCLUDING OPTIONAL AND LIMITED OP-
TIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE UNDER SECTION
20. Note 33 infra and accompanying text. Under an alternative version of the proposal, OPIP
and LOPIP insureds would claim against inverse liability coverage for their economic loss in excess
of applicable OPIP or LOPIP benefits in an accident with other OPIP or LOPIP insureds as well
as with insureds electing the present system. Under this alternative version, those electing the present
system would claim against inverse liability coverage for both economic loss in excess of PIP benefits
as well as noneconomic losses.
21. In the concluding words of the Michigan State Senate Report:
Both financially and philosophically, expanding the options for consumer choice can
improve Michigan's no-fault auto insurance system. Drivers should have the opportunity
to shape their insurance coverage to better suit their economic needs. No-fault must
remain responsive to the needs of the consuming public. Availability, affordability and
fairness can all be enhanced by making Michigan's no-fault system more open to
consumer choice.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 31.
22. 17a.These amendments to section 3104, which section establishes the Michigan Catastrophic
Claims Association (MCCA, see note 9 supra), are necessary both (1) generally to take account of
the proposed amendments to the statute, and (2) particularly to adjust the reallocation of burdens
to fund the MCCA to take account of the limit of any exposure of the fund from those electing
LOPIP. Note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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3180, in excess of $250,000.00 in each loss occurrence. As used in this
section, "ultimate loss" means the actual loss amounts which a member is
obligated to pay and which are paid or payable by the member, and shall
not include claim expenses. An ultimate loss is incurred by the association
on the date on which the loss occurs.
(3) An insurer may withdraw from the association only upon ceasing to write




(6) When a member has been merged or consolidated into another insurer or
another insurer has reinsured a member's entire business which provides the
security required by THIS CHAPTER in this state, the member and suc-
cessors in interests of the member shall remain liable for the member's
obligations.
(7) (a) -no change
(b) -no change
(c) -Maintain relevant loss and expense data relative to all liabilities of the
association and require each member to furnish statistics, in connection
with liabilities of the association, WHICH STATISTICS SHALL BE
SEGREGATED (i) BY LOSSES AND EXPENSES AND LIABILITIES
ARISING FROM THE SECURITY REQUIRED BY SECTION 3101(1)
OR BY SECTION 3103(1), OR BY OPTIONAL PERSONAL PRO-
TECTION INSURANCE UNDER SECTION 3180, AND (ii) FUR-
THER SEGREGATED BY LIMIT OF LIABILITY FROM LIMITED
OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE UNDER SEC-
TION 3180, at the times and in the form and detail as may be required
by the plan of operation.
(d) In a manner provided for in the plan of operation, calculate and charge
to members of the association a total premium sufficient to cover the
expected losses and expenses of the association which the association
will likely incur during the period for which the premium is applicable.
The premium shall include an amount to cover incurred but not reported
losses for the period and may be adjusted for any excess or deficient
premiums from previous periods. Excesses or deficiencies from previous
periods may be fully adjusted in a single period or may be adjusted
over several periods in a manner provided for in the plan of operation.
ANY DEFICIENCY EXISTING ON JANUARY 1, 1993, WILL BE
ADJUSTED BY COLLECTING THE NECESSARY PREMIUM IN
AN EQUAL AMOUNT FOR EACH EARNED CAR YEAR FOR
EACH TYPE AND LIMIT OF INSURANCE PROVIDING THE
SECURITY REQUIRED BY SECTION 3101(l), 3103(1) OR 3180. 2
Each member shall be charged an amount equal to that member's total
earned car years of insurance providing the security required by section
3101(l), or BY SECTION 3103(1), or both AND BY THE MEMBER'S
TOTAL EARNED CAR YEARS OF (i) OPTIONAL PERSONAL
PROTECTION INSURANCE UNDER SECTION 3180, AND (ii) AND
OF LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE
23. This sentence makes clear that any existing deficit when OPIP and LOPIP (see notes 17 and
18 supra and accompanying text) take effect will be funded by all types of vehicles and coverages,
including OPIP and LOPIP.
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UNDER 3180, SEGREGATED BY LIMIT OF LIABILITY, written in
this state during the period to which the premium applies multiplied
by the average premium per car. The average premium per car FOR
EACH TYPE AND LIMIT OF INSURANCE shall be the total pre-
mium CALCULATED FOR EACH TYPE AND LIMIT of insurance
divided by the total earned car years of insurance providing the security
required by section 3101(1), or 3103(1) OR 3180 written in this state
of all members during the period to which the premium applies. ON
OR BEFORE JULY 1, 1992, THE BOARD SHALL SUBMIT ANY
REQUIRED AMENDMENTS TO THE PLAN OF OPERATION
NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE AMENDMENTS TO THIS
SECTION TO THE COMMISSIONER PURSUANT TO SUBSEC-
TION (19) BELOW.
SECTION 3180.
(1) NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3101(l), AN
OWNER OR REGISTRANT OF A PRIVATE PASSENGER NONFLEET
AUTOMOBILE AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2104(1)- ALSO MEETS THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY ON SUCH A VE-
HICLE BY MAINTAINING COVERAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION.
(2) IN ADDITION TO COVERAGE, AT THE LIMITS REQUIRED UNDER
SECTION 3101(l), FOR PROPERTY PROTECTION INSURANCE AND
MODIFIED RESIDUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, WHICH COVERS (i)
BODILY INJURY UNDER SUBSECTION (5), (ii) BODILY INJURY BUT
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES AND POSSES-
SIONS, OR CANADA, AND (iii) BODILY INJURY FOR WHICH LIA-
BILITY IS PRESERVED UNDER SECTION 3101 (1), THE OWNER OR
REGISTRANT OF SUCH A MOTOR VEHICLE MAY MAINTAIN SE-
CURITY IN THE FORM OF EITHER:
(A) THAT SET FORTH UNDER SECTION 3101(3) OR (4) BUT WITH
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO CLAIM, AND BE CLAIMED
AGAINST, FOR RESIDUAL LIABILITY AS SET FORTH BELOW
IN SUBSECTION (5), SUCH SECURITY BEING TERMED "OP-
TIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE,"2OR
(B) PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE AS REQUIRED BY SEC-
TION 3101(1) BUT WITH LIMITS THEREON, AT THE OPTION
OF THE OWNER OR REGISTRANT, OF $250,000, $500,000,
$1,000,000 OR $2,000,000 WITH LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT
TO CLAIM, AND BE CLAIMED AGAINST, FOR RESIDUAL LI-
ABILITY AS SET FORTH BELOW IN SUBSECTION (5), SUCH
SECURITY BEING TERMED "LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL
PROTECTION INSURANCE."2 THE ABOVE LIMITS MAY BE
EXCEEDED BY ALLOWABLE EXPENSES, WORK LOSS AND
SURVIVOR'S LOSS AS DEFINED IN SECTIONS 3107 TO 3110 TO
24. These amendments are not meant to affect other than "private passenger nonfleet automo-
bile," such that commercial cars and trucks remain subject to the unamended law. For a discussion
of various possible treatments of commercial trucks and vehicles under "choice" auto insurance laws,
see O'Connell, supra note 16, 27 Harv. J. on Legislation 143, 154 n. 39; O'Connell, supra note 16,
51 Ohio St. L. J. at 967-98, including n. 74.
25. Note 17 supra and accompanying text.
26. Note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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THE EXTENT SUCH LIMITS ARE CONSUMED BY ALLOWABLE
EXPENSES UNDER SECTION 3107(a).
AN ELECTION OF EITHER OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL
PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE IS BINDING ON THE
OWNER OR REGISTRANT SO ELECTING AS WELL AS ON HIS
OR HER SPOUSE AND ANY RELATIVE OF EITHER DOMICILED
IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD.
(3) EACH INSURER ISSUING MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE
FOR PRIVATE PASSENGER NONFLEET AUTOMOBILES IN THIS
STATE MUST, IN ADDITION TO THE SECURITY OTHERWISE PRO-
VIDED BY SECTION 3101(1), OFFER TO ITS INSUREDS THE OPTION
OF PURCHASING EITHER OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE AT THE LIMITS AUTHORIZED ABOVE.
(4) (A) THE PRIORITIES SET FORTH IN SECTIONS 3114 AND 3115
APPLY TO LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE, EXCEPT THAT NO PERSON WHO HAS ELECTED
A LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE
POLICY, NO SPOUSE OF SUCH A PERSON, AND NO RELATIVE
OF EITHER DOMICILED IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD SHALL
RECOVER PERSONAL PROTECTION BENEFITS IN EXCESS OF
THE LIMIT ELECTED BY SUCH PERSON, REGARDLESS OF
THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER POLICIES WITH HIGHER LIMITS
OR WITH NO LIMIT.2
(B) THE LIMITS UNDER LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTEC-
TION INSURANCE DO NOT APPLY TO ANY PERSON NOT AN
OCCUPANT OF SUCH A MOTOR VEHICLE, NOR SUBJECT TO
AN ELECTION OF (i) OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PER-
SONAL PROTECTION OR (ii) SECURITY OTHERWISE PRO-
VIDED UNDER SECTION 3101(l), NOR IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3101(l).-
(5) WITH REFERENCE TO PRIVATE PASSENGER NONFLEET AUTO-
MOBILES AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2104(1), A PERSON COVERED
BY OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION
INSURANCE (INCLUDING ANY OTHER PERSON WHO MIGHT AS-
SERT A DERIVATIVE CLAIM, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DEATH) MAY ASSERT A CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 3135(2)(C).- IN ADDITION A PERSON
COVERED FOR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE MAY CLAIM DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 3135(2)(C) FOR
ANY AMOUNTS WHICH ARE IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS FOR SUCH
INSURANCE AND WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN RECOVERABLE
UNDER PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE BUT FOR THE SE-
27. This subsection is meant to preclude a LOPIP insured, who is injured as a passenger in, or
as a pedestrian by, a car insured under OPIP or the current system, being able to recover up to the
limits of his or her LOPIP coverage and then recover any excess loss in personal protection insurance
(PIP) benefits applicable to the car insured under OPIP or the current system. The provision similarly
prevents such an LOPIP insured from recovering such excess over LOPIP limits from the Assigned
Claims Facility.
27a. This provision applies to motoryclists and pedestrians not improperly uninsured.
28. 3135(2)(c) preserves actions for economic loss in excess of no-fault limits.
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LECTION OF LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE. 9 OTHERWISE SUCH A PERSON COVERED BY OPTIONAL
OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE
NEITHER HAS NOR IS SUBJECT TO A CLAIM UNDER TORT LIA-
BILITY EXCEPT:
(A) AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 3135(2)(A),-
(B) FOR HARM CAUSED BY ONE NOT MAINTAINING SECURITY
UNDER SUBSECTION (2) ABOVE OR UNDER SECTION 3101(3)
OR (4),3- NOR ENTITLED TO PERSONAL PROTECTION INSUR-
ANCE BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 3113.32 SUCH A PERSON HAS
AND IS SUBJECT TO A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 3135 ALSO
WITH REFERENCE TO ANY PERSON NOT AN OCCUPANT OF
SUCH A MOTOR VEHICLE, NOR SUBJECT TO AN ELECTION
OF (i) OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PRO-
TECTION INSURANCE OR (ii) SECURITY OTHERWISE PRO-
VIDED UNDER SECTION 3101(l), NOR IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3101(l).-
(6) RESIDUAL LIABILITY FOR BODILY INJURY FOR PERSONS MAIN-
TAINING SECURITY UNDER SECTION 3101(1) OR (4) INCLUDES
INVERSE LIABILITY INSURANCE WHICH PAYS FOR DAMAGES
SPECIFIED IN SECTION 3135(2)(B) WHEN DAMAGES ARE CAUSED
IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY A PERSON INSURED UNDER EITHER
OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE. ANY PAYMENT UNDER INVERSE LIABILITY IS DUE IN
THE SAME MANNER AS PAYMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN DUE
FROM SUCH PERSON HAD SUCH PERSON NOT BEEN IMMUNE
FROM LIABILITY UNDER SUBSECTION (5).11 CLAIMS UNDER IN-
VERSE LIABILITY ARE TO BE PROCESSED IN THE SAME PRIORITY
AS THAT SPECIFIED FOR CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION
INSURANCE UNDER SECTIONS 3114 AND 3115.u
(7) (A) ON OR BEFORE JULY 1, 1992, THE COMMISSIONER SHALL
DEVELOP AND PUBLISH A STANDARD FORM FOR ELECTING
OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION
29. Under this provision, both OPIP and LOPIP insureds can claim for economic loss, based
on fault, in excess of PIP coverage, with the next-to-last sentence making clear that the LOPIP
insured has a claim for uncompensated economic loss greater than that provided under section
3135(c), which section preserves the right to claim for economic loss above the wage loss protection
lasting three years. Conceivably a LOPIP insured could exceed his LOPIP benefits before being paid
for three years' wage loss. Thus the need for the next-to-last sentence.
30. This provision preserves a right of action for intentional injury.
31. This provision preserves tort actions against those not insuring despite requirements to do
so. (But the right is more important in theory than in practice, given the likelihood that anybody
not carrying insurance will be judgement proof.)
32. Thus an OPIP or LOPIP insured can still claim against a car thief (but, as in note 31,
query as to the value of the right).
32a. See note 27a supra.
33. Note 20 supra and accompanying text.
34. Sections 3114 and 3115 provide that, in general, personal protection insurance follows the
person, not the car, such that normally a person collects against his own insurer even though
occupying someone else's car when injured. (If insurance follows the car, a person in that situation
would claim against the insurer of the car he occupied.) Thus, the same priorities apply to inverse
liability. Concerning this issue of whether insurance should follow the driver (and his family) or the
car, see U.S. Dep't of Transp., supra note 2, at 137 (1985); R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic
Protection for the Traffic Victim 370-79 (1965).
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INSURANCE, ALONG WITH LIMITATIONS ON TORT RIGHTS
AND LIABILITY. INSURERS MAY USE THIS FORM SEPA-
RATELY OR AS PART OF AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE.
INSURERS MAY ALSO DEVELOP AND USE THEIR OWN FORMS,
WHICH SHALL BE FILED WITH THE COMMISSIONER AND
DEEMED APPROVED UNLESS DISAPPROVED BY THE COM-
MISSIONER WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER FILING. DISAPPROVAL
SHALL BE BASED ONLY UPON THE FAILURE OF THE FORM
TO CONTAIN ALL THE INFORMATION OF THE STANDARD
FORM IN EASILY UNDERSTANDABLE LANGUAGE." ANY SUCH
ELECTION BY A PERSON WHO IS UNDER A LEGAL DISABIL-
ITY SHALL BE MADE ON BEHALF OF SUCH PERSON BY A
PARENT, LEGAL GUARDIAN OR CONSERVATOR AND SHALL
REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL REVOKED OR UNTIL THE PERSON
IS NO LONGER UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY, WHICHEVER IS
SOONER.
(B) AN ELECTION OF EITHER OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL
PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE IS EFFECTIVE ON THE
DATE AND TIME COVERAGE IS BOUND, AND THE ELECTION
APPLIES TO ANY MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT OCCURRING
AFTER THAT TIME. THE ELECTION REMAINS EFFECTIVE AS
LONG AS THE OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL
PROTECTION INSURANCE REMAINS IN EFFECT AND APPLIES
TO ALL RENEWALS, REPLACEMENTS OR REINSTATEMENTS
OF OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTEC-
TION INSURANCE WITH THE SAME INSURER OR AN AFFIL-
IATE OF THE INSURER, WITHOUT THE NECESSITY FOR THE
EXECUTION OF A NEW ELECTION FORM.
(C) THE COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE SHALL ESTABLISH AND
MAINTAIN A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ASSURE THAT CON-
SUMERS ARE ADEQUATELY INFORMED ABOUT THE COM-
PARATIVE COSTS OF BOTH OPTIONAL AND LIMITED
OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE, COM-
PARED TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE COSTS FOR THOSE
WHO DO NOT CHOOSE TO ELECT LIMITATIONS ON TORT
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES, AS WELL AS ABOUT THE BENE-
FITS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSUREDS UNDER
EACH TYPE OF INSURANCE.M
(D) A PERSON WHO ELECTS OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL
PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE ON A FORM DEVEL-
OPED, APPROVED OR DEEMED APPROVED BY THE COMMIS-
SIONER, OR WHO ELECTS SECURITY REQUIRED BY SECTION
3101(3) OR (4), IS BOUND BY THAT CHOICE AND IS PRE-
CLUDED FROM CLAIMING LIABILITY OF ANY PARTY BASED
UPON BEING INADEQUATELY INFORMED AS TO SUCH IN-
SURANCE OR SECURITY. THIS PRECLUSION ALSO APPLIES
35. The phrase "easily understandable language" follows the language in Section 3837(6) con-
cerning options for collision insurance.
36. The Commissioner of Insurance is required by subsection (c) to maintain a program to
assure that consumers are adequately informed about the comparative costs, benefits, rights, and
responsibilities of insureds under the various types of insurance allowed under the Act.
[Vol. 17:155
19911 Michigan's No-Fault Insurance Law
TO THE SPOUSE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN THE POLICY
AND ANY RELATIVE OF EITHER DOMICILED IN THE SAME
HOUSEHOLDY.7 AN INSURER SHALL PROMPTLY PROVIDE A
COPY OF AN EXECUTED ELECTION FORM TO A PERSON OR
A PERSON'S REPRESENTATIVE WHO ASSERTS IN WRITING
A TORT LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST ANYONE WHO IS BOUND
BY AN ELECTION OF OPTIONAL INSURANCE OR LIMITED
OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION.
(E) EACH INSURER ISSUING MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE IN THIS STATE MAY REQUIRE THAT ALL POLICIES
WITHIN A HOUSEHOLD BE OF THE SAME TYPE, WHETHER
(A) OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE POLI-
CIES, (B) LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE POLICIES, OR (C) POLICIES OTHERWISE MEETING
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3101(1). IF MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSEHOLD CANNOT AGREE ON THE TYPE OF COV-
ERAGE, THE INSURER IS AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE A POLICY
MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3101(l)."8
(8) UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED, ALL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE
TO PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE ARE APPLICABLE TO
OPTIONAL AND LIMITED OPTIONAL PERSONAL PROTECTION IN-
SURANCE.
3 9
[(9) IN ANY CLAIM FOR RESIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER SUBSECTION
(5) AND SECTION 3135 BY AN OPTIONAL OR LIMITED OPTIONAL
PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURED, IF THE PARTY CLAIMED
AGAINST PROVIDES THE CLAIMANT, WITHIN NINETY DAYS AF-
TER THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH PARTY RECEIVED WRITTEN
NOTICE OF THE CLAIM, OR IN THE CASE OF AN INSURED PARTY,
WITHIN 90 DAYS AFTER THE INSURER RECEIVES WRITTEN NO-
TICE OF THE CLAIM, WITH A WRITTEN NOTICE TO PAY DAM-
AGES UNDER SECTION 3135(2)(C) (AS QUALIFIED BY SUBSECTION
(5) IN THE CASE OF A CLAIM BY A LIMITED OPTIONAL PER-
SONAL PROTECTION INSURED), THE CLAIMANT ISFORECLOSED
FROM PURSUING THE CLAIM ANY FURTHER EXCEPT AS PRO-
VIDED IN SUBSECTION 5(A) AND (B). IF SUCH OFFER IS NOT
MADE, THE CLAIMANT RETAINS THE RIGHT TO CLAIM NOT
ONLY FOR SUCH DAMAGES BUT ALSO FOR NONECONOMIC LOSS
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 3135(l).]-
37. Subsection (d) states that a person is bound by the choice of the system he selects and "is
precluded from claiming liability of any party based on being adequately informed as to such
insurance." Putting subsections (c) and (d) together, insurers, brokers, and agents are immune from
claims for inadequately informing insureds as to the available choices, provided they furnished
insureds in advance with the information generated by a program maintained or approved by the
Commissioner of Insurance.
38. Subsection (e) provides that a motor vehicle insurer may insist that all motor vehicle insurance
policies within the same household be the same type. Without this provision, an insurer might find
it administratively burdensome to provide automobile insurance to some families. The default
provisions calls for coverage unchanged by the "choice" options contained in the amendments hereby
proposed.
39. Section (8) assures that the new coverages change as little of Michigan's no-fault law as
possible. Thus, for example, Section 3145 providing for a one year statute of limitations for submission
of personal protection insurance benefits applies to OPIP and LOPIP insureds as well.
40. Under this alternative provision (indicated by its being in brackets), OPIP or LOPIP insureds
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SECTION 2. SECTION 3104 AS AMENDED AND SECTION 3180(8)
SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AND SECTIONS 3180(1) THROUGH
(7) AND (9) AND (10) SHALL TAKE EFFECT JANUARY 1, 1993.
do not give up their rights to general damages unless they have been offered prompt payment of
economic loss uncompensated by OPIP or LOPIP benefits. For the origins of this "early offers"
approach, see O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims By
Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 589 (1982).
Under this approach, defendants are encouraged, but not required, to provide expeditiously an offer
to pay benefits covering only net economic loss above collateral sources, rather than spending precious
resources litigating fault and the value of noneconomic loss, in addition to paying for amounts
already paid as collateral sources.
An "early offers" approach is deemed better, for example, than just allowing an injury victim
to claim in tort for only economic loss (and not for pain and suffering) above his PIP coverage.
Under the latter approach, a defending insurer may be under a strong incentive to resist and delay
payment of a tort claim for economic loss, knowing that its exposure is thus limited. This is a
common complaint under tort claims for property damage against less responsible insurers when they
similarly face no exposure to payment of noneconomic loss. Under the "early offers" approach, an
insurer must earn the right to pay a tort claimant only economic loss, by promptly (within 90 days)
offering to do so. On the other hand, a defendant with either no liability or very doubtful liability
- or no or low tort liability insurance - would not be inclined to make an early offer in order to
evade full scale tort liability.
Note that under subsection 9, an OPIP or LOPIP insured retains the right to claim for
noneconomic loss in claims against those insured under OPIP, LOPIP or even the present system,
if such insureds do not make an offer to pay uncompensated economic loss even if the injury is not
severe enough to exceed Michigan's threshold. Unless this was the rule, the possibly inordinate
incentives mentioned above on the part of defendants to resist payment of economic loss operates.
(Actually, only earners of high incomes are likely to suffer economic losses in excess of OPIP or
LOPIP benefits without also suffering injury in excess of the threshold.)
If subsection 9 were to be included in the amendment to Michigan's no-fault law, it could be
coordinated with the prior subsections by including in subsection (2)(a) and (b), after the words "as
set forth in subsection (5)," the words, "subject to subsection (9)," and beginning subsection 5,
"Subject to subsection 9".
